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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
HARVEY L. JONES 
vs. 
- MILDRED CATHERINE HANBURY 
f 
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF IN ERROR. 
FOREMAN, PENDER & DYER, 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff in Error. 
IN THE· 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
HARVEY L. JONES 
vs. 
MILDRED CATHERINE HANBURY 
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF IN ERROR. 
This cause falls in that class of cases in which a 
guest is taking against her host in a gratuitous pleasure 
accommodation that action which has been recently de-
scribed by this court as action that "Shocks one's sense 
of justice," Boggs v. Plybon, 160 South Eastern, (Va. 
1931) 77. 
Counsel for appellee in his reply brief . has raised 
certain questions of fact in his restatement contrary to 
appellant's reading of the evidence. This reply of ap-
pellant will be directed first to pointing out the apparent 
discrepancies and clarifying the facts upon which the 
issues are to be decided. 
The allegations in appellee's brief to which attention 
is asked particularly are as follows: 
a. The speed of the several cars involved, viz: forty-
five miles per hour for appellant's car and thirty-five 
miles per hour for the car being passed on the road. 
b. The lapse of time involved in the sequence of 
events. 
c. The distances covered at the stated rates of speed 
and time involved. 
( 1 ) 
Appellee's statement to the contrary notwithstand-
ing, there is with one exception no positive statement 
in the record . from which any rates of speed, lapse of 
time, or distance can be ascertained. Miss Hanbury 
stated that the crash came three or four seconds after 
Jones took hold of the wheel. See Record page 23. All 
other statements thereto were at best the most specu-
lative conjecture. The most that can be said of the 
speed of the Chevrolet car being passed, was that it was 
going at some rate of speed less than the spurt of speed. 
undertaken by Miss Hanbury in her effort to pass. See 
Record page 28 where she stated that she was speeding 
up to pass the Chevrolet. The speed of the Ford car 
driven by Miss Hanbury is baaed entirely on an estimate, 
and attention is calle~. to the fact that in making her 
estimate, she, four months after the occurrence, care-
fully placed her speed while passing traffic going in the 
same direction, at the lawful rate prescribed by statute, 
to,-wit: forty to forty-five miles per hour. 
The crest of the hill which obscured the road is 
definitely placed by appellee's witness, Leet, at les·s than 
eighty steps from the place of the accident. See Record 
pag 16 where he states the point eighty steps from the 
accident was just past the top of the hill. 
ARGUMENT. 
FffiST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
Appellee attempts to brush aside the second assign-
ment of error by the statement that his cause of action 
was properly stated in the bill of particulars. Attention 
of the court is respectfully called to the fact that the 
office of a bill of particulars is to. clarify the action de-
clared on, and is in no wise a part of the declaration 
.. or considered as a pleading. See Campbell Company v. 
George Angus & Company, 91 Va. 438. See also 49 C. J. 
804, §1186 as follows: "A bill of particulars cannot broaden 
the issue presented by the declaration or complaint." Here 
appellee has declared on an allegation of' careless driving 
of the appellant Jones, an entirely different action from 
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that shown by the· evidence, viz: the alleged negligent 
grabbing of the steering wheel,. or interfering with the 
driver. In complete answer to appellee's declaration on 
the driving of appellant Jones, the court is referred to 
the statement of ·appellee at the top of page 8 of his 
brief, that Jones acted properly, and according to his 
best judgment under the circumstances. 
The cases seem to be in com·plete accord on this point. 
In the case of Trout Brook Ice and Feed Company v. H·art· 
ford Electric Light Company (Conn. 1904) 59 Atl. 405, 
the declaration charged negligence in rapid. driving and 
striking plain~iff's horses. The case proved at' the trial 
was the slow approach of the automobile and failure to 
stop upon seeing the horses badly frightened. Verdict 
for the plaintiff wa:s set aside, the. court using Jhe follow-
ing 'language in so doing: 
"The complaint correctly descri~bed the result of 
defendant's acts. Its acts, however, which alone 
constituted its wrong as the court has ·found it, are 
not alleged even in essence. * * * It therefore 
follows that the plaintiff, having set out one cause 
of ·action has ·had judgment for another." See also 
Smiley v. Kenney (Kansas 1921) 228 South West .. 
-ern 857, and Zimwich v. Coman, (N. Dak. 1931) 
Also s.fi'\tt1"dhisn8.9·etc. v. Bowles,92Va..?38,24 s.E.588 
It is therefore earnestly .contended that the cause f!t .,.. . •• ,.. . 
of action herein pleaded was not proved in the trial and 
appellant's motion to strike out appellee's evidence should 
have been sustained by the court below. 
SEOOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
Appellee's attenuated argu:q~.ent based on the feet 
per second traveled at the estimated speed condemns 
itself. The space of five seconds is allowed appellant 
Jones or· appellee Hanbury from the grabbing of the 
wheel to the accident to formulate their judgment and 
put into execution the plan of escape. .A:lmost any action 
is excusable in so short a space of time in the face of 
the great danger here presented. 
(3) 
Appellee has admitted top of page 8 of his brief,. 
that appellant Jones, having taken the wheel, exercised . 
his best judgment and acted therein as an ordinarily 
prudent man would have acted when confronted with 
danger. 
. Therefore the only pQint left under this assignment: 
of error is whether or not a danger was presented jus-
tifying any interference on the part of· ·appellant Jones .. 
This danger did exist as is fully shown by' the record. 
The approaching car f:rom the north was obstructed from. 
Miss Hanbury's vision, as she stated that when she did 
finally see ·the car, only the top was visible. Record 
page 24. Miss Hanbury was in and fully ·realized the 
danger at the time Jones ,grabbed the wheel. See record 
bottom of page 28 where she said: 
"I can't say I got scared at all until I knew 
what was going. to happen and he caught the 
wheel." 
The predicament optimistically referred to in ap-
pellee's brief as a "pseudo predicament" was therefore 
as follows: 
Appellee driving northbound at forty to forty-five 
miles .p.er . ..hDJJr· :Q:f fas.te~ at. ,a .P.Q.int ip. . ;tl;le . ro~d . w~~t:e 
oncoming cars were for some of the distance obscured,. 
was in the act of passing another car and was in such a 
position that a turn to the right would have struck th~ 
car to the right. Record page 28. A large .Packard sedan 
southbound suddenly appeared in the roadway making a. 
head-on coUision imminent. The existence of this danger 
is made to appear positively from the fact that a collision . 
did occur in from three to four seconds following the real-
ization of the danger. Record page 28. 
Faced then by this predicament, this impending 
danger, the weakness and fright of appellee Miss Han-
bury and perhaps laboring under considerable excite-
ment himself, appellant Jones' action was clearly such 
as would have been taken by any ordinarily prudent man 
( 4 ) 
r 
under the same or similar circum·sta.nces. He was the 
stronger and more self-reliant of the two, he realized 
the danger. and made every effort to avoid the collision 
and save himself and his guest from harm.· 
Although appellee's brief "readily admits" the pro-
priety of appellant Jones' actions after taking hold of 
the wheel, comment thereon at this point is deemed in 
order. The first effort of Jones was to try and avoid 
the accident by getting on the right side of the road 
and out of the way of the oncoming car. This was 
quickly shown to be impossible. A turn to the right 
would have struck the .Chevrolet. Record page 28. Miss 
Hanbury was not operating the brake, and stopping or 
slowing up in time to drop behind the Chevrolet, was 
therefore impossible. Record page 28. Passing the Chev-
rolet was likewise impossible witliout superhuman skill 
and reckless daring. Appellee's brief shows with a math-
ematical nicety a possible forty-eight and thirty-five hun-
dredths· feet clearance which might have been available 
had Miss Hanbury kept her foot on the accelerator. 
This ·she did not do. See Record page 28. Using ap-
pellee's measure of speed, the forty-eight and thirty-five 
hundredths feet of clearance meant an allowance of time 
of less .than three-quarters of a second. Therefore the 
only :alternative .was that which appellant Jones took, 
viz: a sharp turn to the left in· the hope that .he could 
get onto the_ wide shoulder, or into the ditch, and avoid 
the accident. 
AUTHORITIES. 
The first case cited by appellee's brief, White v. 
Parks (1928) Maryland reported in 140 Atlantic at page 
70, is not applicable, as the grabbing of the wheel by 
the defendant therein was not the negligence upon which 
the case was decided. In that case plaintiff had never 
driven any automobile before and was out for instruc-
tion. The defendant's ·negligence there consisted in not 
grabbing the wheel sooner, not in the act of interfering. 
At page 7 4. of the Atlantic Reporter, the following lan-
guage appears: 
( 5 ) 
"There was proof tending to show that the 
instructor was also negligent, with respect to his 
inexperienced pupil in not using care hi watching 
her driving at a dangerous point for a learner, and 
in not being 1·eady to interfere as quickly as the 
occasion arose, and that if he had been r~sonably 
careful under the circumstances he would have been 
able to have talcen cont?·ol of the steering wheel in 
time to save the appellee from injury." (Itallics 
supplied.) 
The second case cited, Hooks v. Orton (Texas-1930) 
reported in 30 South Western (2nd) at page 681, is like-
wi~e not applicable to· the instant case. There the neg-
ligence with which defendant was charged was not the 
taking of the wheel so much as it was her action after 
taking the wheel in taking a dangerous route. Even 
then her action was not ·held to be negligence by the 
court, which used the following language in reversing 
the case: 
No person will be held responsible for his 
acts or omissions which occur when through nQo 
fault of his own, his mind is in such a state of 
fright or terror as to render him incapable of 
acting with ordinary care and prudence." 
This it may here be said is the law of this State .. 
See Michie's Digest Volume Seven, page 668, paragraph 
35, and the many cases there cited. 
See also 45 Corpus J urus, page 992, · (quoted in Hooks 
v. Orton, Supra) : 
"There can be no recovery if defendant after 
being aware of the plaintiff's peril, did what an 
ordinarily prudent person would have done under 
the . same or similar circumstances to avoid the 
injury." 
This case comes directly witliin the rule laid down 
in the case of Boggs v. Plybon decided by this court 
after the instant .case was tried below and reported in 
160 _South Eastern at page 77. Plaintiff below was the 
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invited guest of appellant Jones, riding to W·ashington · 
for her pleasure and joining in the operation of the car 
as she had done many times theretofore. Defendant 
Jones therefore owed her no further duty as a guest 
than not to 'expose her wantonly or .u~reasonably to 
danger. She assumed in accepting the hospitality of de-
fendant Jones all ordinary risks of the trip and the 
da;nger in which she put herself was surely such a risk. 
It cannot be said that Jones in his effort to save him-
self, his guest and his car from injury, knowingly or 
wantonly added anything to the perils of the venture. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the ver-
dict in this case is within the rule of this cou'rt and the 
statute defining the rule of decision, clearly wrong and 
should be set aside for the failure of the evidence to 
disclose any negligence what~oever on the part of de-
fendant Jones as alleged in the . notice of motion herein, 
for the reason that plaintiff herself is shown to have 
been guilty of all the negligence appearing in the case, 
and for the reason . that as a guest of defendant Jones, 
she· has not by Jones been exposed wantonly or reck-
lessly to danger. 
For the reasons we have heretofore set out, we 
therefore ask that the judgment of the lower court. be 
set aside and judgment entered in this court for appel-
lant, :s;:arvey L. Jones. 
Respectfully s.ubmitted, 
FOREMAN, PENDER & DYER, 
Counsel. 
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